Introduction: Legislation and the Law of Politics (Symposium: Election Law) by Tushnet, Mark
 
Introduction: Legislation and the Law of Politics (Symposium:
Election Law)
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Legislation and the Law of Politics
(Symposium: Election Law), 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 211 (2009).
Accessed February 17, 2015 4:20:53 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2757498
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 1  5-FEB-09 8:11
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
LEGISLATION AND THE LAW OF POLITICS
MARK T USHNET*
On March 6, 2008, the Harvard Journal on Legislation held a public symposium
addressing election law issues, in anticipation of the elections that were to take
place later that year. This piece briefly presents the importance of election laws
to legislation in a broad sense, discusses paradoxes unique to the intersection of
politics and substantive legislation, and introduces two articles by symposium
panelists that address some of these issues in greater depth.
Perhaps it should go without extended discussion, but an introduction
seems an appropriate place for a few words on why a journal on legislation
would hold a symposium on the law of politics—campaign finance rules,
legislative districting, voter identification rules, and the like. The law of
politics provides the structure for the operation of our political system, and
the operation of that system is the essential predicate for the adoption of
legislation of any sort. Moreover, different structures of politics—which is
to say, different incarnations of the law of politics—systematically produce
different legislative outcomes. Anyone interested in legislation—whether
generally or in some specific subject area—must be interested in the law of
politics.
Yet, the connection between the law of politics and substantive legisla-
tion creates some paradoxes. Here I sketch some paradoxes of legislation
and litigation and suggest that the articles that follow this Introduction be
read with them in mind.
The first paradox of legislation emerges directly from the connection I
have identified. Casual observers can see that changing the rules by which
politics operates affects substantive outcomes.1 But, if casual observers can
see this, how much more obvious it is to the politicians who create the law
of politics. It is now commonplace to observe that legislatively enacted cam-
paign finance rules favor the major parties.2 Similarly, recently adopted
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1967; M.A., Yale University, 1971; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971. The author served as
one of the moderators for the Harvard Journal on Legislation Symposium, Voices on Voting:
Election Law in 2008.
1 For example, proportional representation systems provide a different structure for coali-
tion building than do systems in which legislators are elected from single districts in which the
candidate with the highest number of votes wins, even without a majority of the district. For a
description of this phenomenon, see Maurice Duverger, Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty
System, in PARTY P OLITICS AND P RESSURE G ROUPS 23–32 (David Wagoner trans., Crowell
1972).
2 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN L. REV. 643, 688-89 (1998) (describing the ways in which
existing campaign finance rules entrench the two major parties). I should emphasize that here
and throughout I describe tendencies, not inevitabilities. Parties favored by campaign finance\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 2  5-FEB-09 8:11
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stringent voter identification laws are believed to produce more Republican
office holders,3 as shown by their tendency to be adopted or rejected on
strictly partisan lines.4
With this as the simple background, suppose you are dissatisfied with
some public policy such as the existing policy on income security.5 How can
you change that policy? Putting aside some complexities that do not affect
the basics of the analysis,6 you must replace some legislators who support
the existing policy with new legislators who support the policy change.
Here, though, you might worry about the implications of incumbent-protect-
ing laws of politics: you will not be able to replace those legislators unless
you change the laws of politics.
This leads to the first paradox of legislation.7 Given the connection be-
tween the laws of politics and substantive policy outcomes, why should it be
any easier to change the laws of politics than to change the substantive poli-
cies?8 That is, if you are able to mobilize enough voters to convince legisla-
tors, who understand the connection between those laws and substantive
outcomes, to modify the laws of politics, why wouldn’t you thereby have
mobilized enough voters to change the substantive outcomes directly?9
One possible response relies on making the “model” of politics a bit
more complicated. So far I have been assuming that voters (and legislators)
are interested only in substantive policies. Suppose, though, that there is a
third group whose members are indifferent to substantive policies, or at least
to the particular substantive policy around which the reform mobilization
rules might lose their positions because of forces outside the politicians’ control, such as a bad
economy or a war that goes well or badly; however, even if they do not provide complete
immunity, incumbent-protecting finance rules provide politicians with some degree of insula-
tion from those outside forces.
3 See Joyce Purnick, Stricter Voting Laws Carve Latest Partisan Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2006, at A1 (“Democrats . . . accuse Republicans of suppressing the votes of those least
likely to have the required documentation—minorities, the poor and the elderly—who tend to
vote for Democrats.”).
4 See Linda Greenhouse, In a 6-to-3 Vote, Justices Uphold a Voter ID Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2008, at A1 (observing that the statute upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008), was “adopted by the Republican-controlled legislature in 2005
without a single Democratic vote”).
5 I use an example that can be given both a conservative and a liberal political valence.
6 For example, legislative inertia may mean that it takes more than simply a majority to
change an existing policy.
7 The argument I sketch here is at least a cousin to that made by Adrian Vermeule in Self-
Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 637–38
(2006).
8 Reformers who note the self-interest incumbents have in the laws of politics that has led
them to where they are sometimes propose other reform strategies, such as enacting changes in
the laws of politics by direct voter legislation (through an initiative or referendum), or replac-
ing the enactment of the laws of politics by self-interested legislators with the administration
of such laws by expert agencies exercising delegated authority that sets only the broadest of
limits on what the agencies can do.
9 For a good presentation of this paradox, see Louis Michael Seidman, Democracy and
Legitimation: A Response to Professor Guinier, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 77 (2002).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 3  5-FEB-09 8:11
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occurs, but who do want to achieve “good government.”10 You might be
able to persuade them to support your ideas about changing the laws of polit-
ics by making good-government arguments, and then having changed the
laws of politics, you might be able to elect new legislators who support the
substantive outcomes you prefer (as to which, again, the good-government
voters are indifferent).
Perhaps this “model” of politics dissolves the initial paradox of legisla-
tion, but it generates other questions, if not quite paradoxes. First, it is not
clear to me on what basis a person could be interested in good government
in the abstract, or good government as such. Generally, government is good
to the extent that it produces good policies.11 If so, a person who favors good
government as such, indifferent to policy outcomes, is simply confused
about what “good government” means.12
Second, even if we can make sense of the idea of a preference for good
government as such, it is not clear how this preference could be mobilized in
the reform campaign I have described. Many of those supporting the change
in the laws of politics will do so because they believe that the change will
produce new substantive outcomes. The electoral campaign for the change
then faces a serious rhetorical problem: those leading the campaign will have
to say to the supporters of a change in substantive outcomes, “vote for this
reform of the laws of politics because it will lead to the changes you want in
income security policy,” while saying to the good-government voters, “vote
for this reform because it embodies good government.” This dual strategy
will open the campaigners up to the charge of insincerity: “You don’t really
care about good government, do you?”
Third—related and perhaps even more problematic—the good-govern-
ment versions of the laws of politics are all quite contestable, in the sense
that a reasonable case can be made in support of particular laws of politics
that fall within a wide range. Stringent voter identification laws, for exam-
ple, serve the ends of good government to the extent that they prevent in-
person voter fraud, but less stringent ones serve the ends of good govern-
ment by making it easier for some people to exercise their responsibility as
10 For ease of exposition I include within this group voters who are interested in good
government and have some interest in substantive outcomes but are unaware of the connection
between the laws of politics and the outcomes they care about (and who will not become
informed of that connection by those who are better informed).
11 While I put aside here laws that serve “merely” expressive purposes, my instinct, unin-
formed by serious consideration, is that the argument in the text holds true as to them as well.
12 Lurking in the back of my mind is the possibility that an interest in good government as
such might precipitate out of interests different groups have in different policy domains. But
even if it does, it does not seem to me that the reform strategy I have described in the text
could succeed to the extent that it is motivated by concern about outcomes in a particular
policy domain.
Adrian Vermeule suggested to me that there might be another group of good-government
supporters: those who are more certain about what constitutes good government than they are
about which policies are good. I suppose so, although I remain puzzled about the basis on
which such people determine that something actually embodies good-government principles.\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 4  5-FEB-09 8:11
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citizens to vote. Given the availability of reasonable arguments for sharply
contrasting rules of the laws of politics, on what basis can a person with a
preference for good government make her choice? The most plausible an-
swer, I think, is: on the basis of the outcomes that will result from one or the
other rule.13 If so, we have simply returned to our original proposition: an
electoral campaign seeking to change the laws of politics so as to change
substantive outcomes, with no reason to think that it is any easier to accom-
plish the change in outcomes through a two-step process than through a one-
step one.
Influenced by Supreme Court decisions from Baker v. Carr14 and its
progeny, today’s lawyers—perhaps believing that self-interested legislators
will not change the laws of politics and perhaps understanding the paradoxes
of legislation I have sketched—sometimes seek to change the laws of polit-
ics through litigation rather than legislation.15 This method, too, presents
paradoxes.
One paradox of litigation is that litigation over the laws of politics is
most likely to mobilize judges’ partisan affiliations. As members of the in-
formed political elites, judges are likely to be aware of the partisan effects of
what they hold the laws of politics to be. When legal materials make it possi-
ble to construct decent arguments either way—as will quite often be the
case—judges will be inclined to believe that the best construction is the one
that conforms to their partisan presuppositions. Litigation that seeks to dis-
place the partisan “distortions” of the laws of politics may then simply lead
to validation or invalidation of those distortions on partisan lines, “dis-
torting” judicially developed law with personal political inclinations.
A second and more interesting paradox of litigation arises directly from
the many reasonable specifications of what the laws of politics should be in
a well-functioning democracy.16 Constitutional litigation calls on the courts
to choose one of many such specifications in the name of democracy. Courts
are many things, but democratic voices—even voices for democracy—they
are not. Certainly, though, courts can police the outer boundaries of the laws
of politics, to purge the statute books of laws that are in no sense democracy-
13 Louis Michael Seidman has regularly pressed on me the tension between the argument
sketched here and my “advocacy” of the abolition of judicial review on good-government
grounds, to the extent that I have so advocated. For a recent exchange, see Louis M. Seidman,
Can Constitutionalism be Leftist?, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 557 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Re-
sponse, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 727 (2008).
14 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (seeking un-
successfully to overturn a state law banning “fusion” candidacies in which a named candidate
appears on the ballot under two parties’ names, with all votes for the candidate counted).
16 Recast in terms made familiar by more recent discussions, this is the core of Justice
Frankfurter’s dissent in Baker v. Carr. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 301 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“The notion that [proportional representation] is so universally accepted as a
necessary element of equality . . . —that it is . . . ‘the basic principle of representative govern-
ment’—is, to put it bluntly, not true.”).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 5  5-FEB-09 8:11
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promoting.17 But, the case for judicial selection of one law of politics over
another, so long as each is reasonable, is less than compelling.
The Symposium articles that follow deal with the laws of politics at the
stages of both legislation and litigation. Heather Heidelbaugh and her co-
authors emphasize the reasons for adopting poll watcher laws and then turn
to litigation over the constitutionality of such laws. Laughlin McDonald de-
scribes the possibility that partisan gerrymandering will affect redistricting
after the 2010 census and then emphasizes the need for doctrines that can be
used effectively in litigation as well as other legislative responses. Whether,
or to what extent, the problems the authors address implicate the paradoxes
of legislation and litigation is for the reader to decide.
17 Examples are hard to come by precisely because a wide variety of laws can reasonably
be described as democracy-promoting. Campaign-finance regulations, the regulation of the
content of cable programming, and hate-speech regulation are good examples of regulations
that reasonable people could reasonably think are democracy-promoting. The best examples of
regulations that are extremely difficult to defend as democracy-promoting may be First
Amendment decisions barring the government from punishing people for expressing disagree-
ment with government policy. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidat-
ing a state law making “criminal syndicalism” unlawful).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\46-1\HLL105.txt unknown Seq: 6  5-FEB-09 8:11